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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this article is to illustrate potential conduits for money laundering in the con-
sulting sector in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. A qualitative content 
analysis of 100 semi-standardized expert interviews with both criminals and prevention 
experts was conducted, along with a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers, allowing 
for the identification of concrete methods of money laundering in the consulting sector. Due 
to their excellent reputation, consulting companies in German-speaking countries in Europe 
continue to be extraordinarily attractive to money launderers. Most notably, they can be 
used for layering and integration, as well as for working around various issues with tax 
codes. As the qualitative findings are based on semi-standardized interviews, they are lim-
ited to only the 100 interviewees’ perspectives. The identification of loopholes and weaknesses 
in the current anti-money laundering mechanisms is meant to provide compliance officers, 
law enforcement agencies, and legislators with valuable insights into how criminals operate, 
with the aim of helping them to more effectively combat money laundering. While the 
previous literature focuses on organizations fighting money laundering and on the improve-
ment of anti-money laundering measures, this article illustrates how money launderers 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well-known that laundering illegally obtained money is expensive. Nevertheless, crim-
inals are often willing to spend a significant portion of their criminal assets on laundering 
activities. Prominent examples include, but are by no means limited to, using restaurants, 
bars or nightclubs to disguise criminal activity.1 In these examples, money launderers pre-
tend to have more revenue than they actually have and, thereby, place pecuniary proceeds 
from illegal activities into legitimate businesses. However, this implies that they need to 
maintain a certain infrastructure, which usually has its own associated costs, and, ulti-
mately, they must pay taxes on the money they place into the businesses that act as fronts 
for their illegal activities.2 In result, laundering cost can easily exceed 30 percent of the 
assets laundered. 
 
However, money laundering can actually be quite profitable if done through the right 
conduits. This research article illustrates money laundering in the consulting sector in 
Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland from the criminal’s perspective. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The inception of money in human society was undoubtedly followed by the immediate 
rise of its laundering for criminal purposes. It was outlawed primarily to combat drug 
trafficking, under the rationale that trading drugs would be less attractive if it was subse-
quently difficult to spend or invest the proceeds of criminal activities. Today, money 
laundering, which includes revenue made from large variety of criminal activities, has 
been outlawed all around the world.3 
 
Almost all definitions of money laundering include hiding, moving, or investing criminal 
assets. For the purposes of this study, money laundering is considered as any “act that is 
aimed at frustrating the identification of the origin, the tracing or the forfeiture of assets 
which [an individual] knows or must assume originate from a felony or aggravated tax 
misdemeanor” (Art. 305bis of the Swiss Criminal Code). The definition in Article 305bis 
of the Swiss Criminal Code is an exemplary national implementation of Article 3 of the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, which was adopted in Vienna on December 19th 1988. It contains a compre-
	
		
1  Fabian Teichmann, Real Estate Money Laundering in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, 3, 
JOURNAL OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (2018), p. 370. 
2  Fabian Teichmann, Twelve Methods of Money Laundering, 20 (2), JOURNAL OF MONEY LAUNDERING CON-
TROL (2017), pp. 130 f. 
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hensive description of this crime, and it emphasizes that money laundering aims to ob-
scure the provenance, tracing, or forfeiture of criminal assets.4 
 
The vast majority of the existing literature focuses either on mechanisms and organiza-
tions aimed at preventing money laundering or on attempts at estimating its volume.5 
However, these estimates are not very convincing, given the paucity of data and not 
knowing the true extent of global organized crime. Nonetheless, it is commonly acknowl-
edged that money laundering continues to be a massive global problem6, and efforts at 
curbing such criminal activity have so far proved inadequate.7 
 
Assessment of the national implementation of anti-money laundering laws is conducted 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which also coordinates global efforts in the 
fight against money laundering.8 The overwhelming majority of the FATF’s recommen-
dations focus on the financial sector, while other areas, such as the consulting sector, have 
received less attention in the past. Moreover, although the literature outlines several stages 
in money laundering, such as placement, layering and integration, it does not explain ex-
actly how criminals act.9 In the past, the analysis of cash transactions has played an im-
portant role in better understanding money laundering.10 
 
The classic case of money laundering has three stages: placement, layering and integration. 
Money is placed during the first stage – both the most important and most difficult step 
in the process, as the criminal assets are cleaned of their most immediate traces during this 
	
		
4  Fabian Teichmann, Umgehungsmöglichkeiten der Geldwäschereipräventionsmassnahmen (1st ed. 2016), pp. 
12 f. 
5  Michele Bagella, Francesco Busato & Amedeo Argentiero, Money laundering in a micro-founded dynamic 
model: simulations for the US and the EU-15 economies, REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2009), p. 896; 
Elöd Takáts, A theory of ‘crying wolf’: The economics of money laundering enforcement, IMF WORKING PAPER 
(2007), p. 4. 
6  Harvey, (2004), p. 339; Van Duyne, (1994), p. 62; Walker, (1999), p. 36. 
7  Friedrich Schneider, Money laundering and financial means of organised crime: some preliminary empirical 
findings, 10(3), GLOBAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS REVIEW (2008), p. 309 f.; Fabian Teichmann, Recent 
trends in money laundering and terrorism financing, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLI-
ANCE (2019), p. 1 f. 
8  Samuel Kern Alexander, The international anti-money-laundering regime: The role of the financial action task 
force, 4 (3), JOURNAL OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL (2001), p. 231; Todd Doyle, Cleaning up anti-
money laundering strategies: current FATF tactics needlessly violate international law, HOUSTON JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001), p. 312; Michael Levi & William Gilmore, Terrorist finance, money launder-
ing and the rise and rise of mutual evaluation: a new paradigm for crime control?, in: Financing Terrorism 
(Mark Pieth, 1st ed. 2002), p. 88. 
9  Christoph Graber, Das neue GwG: Gesetzesausgabe mit englischer Übersetzung, Ausführungserlassen und 
Anmerkungen, 2 (2009); Friedrich Schneider & Ursula Windischbauer, Money laundering: some facts, EURO-
PEAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2008), p. 394; Stefan Trechsel, Geldwäscherei: Prävention und 
Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung (1997), p. 14. 
10  Fabian Teichmann, Recent trends in money laundering and terrorism financing, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE (2019), pp. 1 f. 
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phase.11 This followed by the layering stage, whereby the money is provided with an ac-
counting legend. Layering often involves opening bank accounts in various jurisdic-
tions.12 Lastly, the money is integrated into the legal economic cycle13 – the stage that un-
derscores the fundamental importance of accountants to money launderers.14 
 
In sum, this study investigates how accommodating the consulting sector is for money 
laundering. In addition, concrete methods of money laundering are illustrated, and the 
criminals’ detection risk are taken into account. Finally, perspectives of compliance offic-
ers are also provided. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Since prior studies have not explored criminals’ money laundering methods, the literature 
review could not present a quantitatively testable hypothesis due to lack of data. There-
fore, we adopted an exploratory, and thus qualitative, approach, having chosen semi-
standardized expert interviews as a suitable research method. 
 
When selecting interviewees, it was important to include the perspectives of both crimi-
nals and experts in compliance and prevention within our sample. Hence, our research 
was divided evenly between 50 informal interviews with presumed white-collar criminals 
and 50 formal interviews with prevention experts, all of whom requested and were 
granted anonymity. After the analysis of the 100 interviews, theoretical saturation had 
been reached and the answers tended to become repetitive, and therefore further sam-
pling became unnecessary. Both groups were asked how they could hypothetically get 
away with money laundering and to address three essential elements: (a) the resources 
needed, (b) concrete steps, and (c) detection risks.  
 
Personal network was tapped in the recruitment of interviewees, which includes an ex-
tensive pool of well-qualified compliance professionals and law enforcement officers 
(connections made during seminars given in the past). The age of the formal interviewees 
ranged from 27 to 76, the majority of whom worked for financial institutions (78 per-
cent), followed by government ministries (ten percent), prosecutor’s offices (six percent), 
and financial intelligence units (six percent). The range of industry experience was 5-35 




11  Christoph Graber, Das neue GwG: Gesetzesausgabe mit englischer Übersetzung, Ausführungserlassen und 
Anmerkungen (2009), p. 2. 
12  John Madinger, A Guide for Criminal Investigators (3rd ed. 2011), p. 20. 
13  Friedrich Schneider & Ursula Windischbauer, Money laundering: some facts, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS (2008), p. 394; Stefan Trechsel, Geldwäscherei: Prävention und Massnahmen zur Bekämp-
fung (1997), p. 14; Gao & Xu, XXX (2009), p. 1494. 
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Recruiting the launderers themselves for interviews was more challenging. Thankfully, 
however, the first named author is well connected with the law enforcement sphere in 
Eastern Europe, and his contacts were able to put him in touch with presumed criminals. 
The informal interviewees ranged from 22-78 years of age. Given that the conversations 
strictly focused on potential ways of laundering money, no specific (underlying) crimes 
were discussed. Furthermore, the informal interviewees’ criminal record were not in-
quired about, in order to avoid ethical dilemmas.  
 
Moreover, while this study focuses on money laundering trends in Austria, Germany, 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland, interviewees from all over the world were recruited. The 
underlying reasoning was that, while the aforementioned four countries are particularly 
suitable for money laundering, the perpetrators do not necessarily need to be Austrian, 
German, Swiss or Liechtenstein nationals. Nevertheless, the formal interviews were com-
posed mostly by Swiss (46 percent), followed by Austrian (24 percent), German (16 per-
cent) and Liechtenstein (six percent) nationals. The informal interviews, however, in-
cluded Ukrainian (32 percent), Russian (30 percent), and Italian (28 percent) nationals, all 
of whom were considerably knowledgeable about money laundering in the German-
speaking area of Europe.  
 
Given that the presumed criminals would have not given their consent to be recorded for 
fear of possible prosecution, the informal interviews were documented through memory 
protocols, specifically involving note-taking both during and immediately after the inter-
views. Although this might be considered a limitation of the study, it was the only realistic 
means of including the money launderers’ perspectives in the study. However, the formal 
interviews with prevention experts were recorded and transcribed. 
 
Qualitative content analysis15 was performed on both sets of interviews. In particular, the-
matically similar statements were categorized, which were then reduced to generalizable 
core items for the facilitation of further analysis. Triangulation was used to assess the cat-
egory system’s objectivity, reliability, and validity. Furthermore, given that the author 
conducted the entire coding process, inter-rater reliability did not have to be assessed.  
 
The results of the qualitative study were used to formulate the following three hypothe-
ses, each tested via a quantitative survey of 200 compliance officers: 
(1) Compliance officers assess the role of the consulting sector in money launder-
ing as significant. 
(2) Compliance officers rarely see cases of money laundering in the consulting sec-
tor. 
(3) Compliance officers believe that, from their experience, the money laundering 




15  Philipp Mayring, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken (2010), pp. 7 ff. 
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A password-secured online questionnaire was then created and distributed to carefully 
selected experts. 
 
The quantitative survey was backed by a major compliance advisory firm, which provided 
a list of potential respondents. Letters with individual user names and passwords were 
sent to all individuals on the list. The survey resulted in a 43 % response rate was achieved. 
FluidSurveys, a survey software, was used to collect quantitative data.16 
IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
A. General Suitability 
 
Consultancy firms – as legal and recognized entities operating largely outside regulated 
areas – appear to be particularly suitable for the layering and integration stages of money 
laundering. Non-transparent price formation and performance is difficult to objectify 
and thus is only conditionally measurable; however, it strengthens the suitability of these 
firms for money laundering. 
 
Moreover, given that cash payments are rather uncommon in the consulting industry, 
consulting companies have only limited suitability for the placement level. Large cash 
amounts intended for deposit are usually questioned by the compliance departments of 
the banks However, if the cash has already been paid in, layering and integration can be 
carried out by consulting companies. Money launderers can inject cash into the banking 
system in jurisdictions where the deposit of large cash amounts does not come under close 
scrutiny and then remit them to a consulting firm abroad. This consulting firm can then 
use the services of other companies, ideally also owned by the money launderer, and ulti-
mately the money can be invested in legal activities, such as listed public companies. 
 
Through such a strategy, consulting companies gain a significant advantage of being able 
to create legal and recognized structures with relatively little effort. For example, imagine 
a stock corporation in Switzerland that is required to pay 100,000 Swiss francs for a start-
up account. These costs can be easily covered, along with another mere 5,000 Swiss francs 
to create a serious Internet presence. Finally, the “company” would need to organize a 
small office (often for comparatively low rent). Having done all this, a legal entity domi-
ciled in Switzerland would appear (on paper) in international business dealings. 
 
Close scrutiny by the authorities is circumvented by avoiding regulated areas. In addition, 
financial advisers or insurance brokers tend to be less likely to engage in money laundering 
than marketing consultants. Moreover, a marketing consultancy firm does not need to 




16  Fabian Teichmann, Recent trends in money laundering and terrorism financing, JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE (2019), p. XX. 
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Furthermore, consulting services are often very difficult to objectify and therefore hardly 
measurable, illustrated by the above-mentioned example of marketing advice. While the 
value of a legal opinion or investment advice should still be in proportion to the amount 
in dispute or to the assets to be invested, the development of a marketing strategy involves 
much greater discretion, especially when dealing with a new trademark, the value of which 
is difficult to fix. 
 
B. Concrete Steps 
 
First, the money launderer must choose a trustworthy country, preferably Switzerland, to 
establish a business. They should disguise the beneficial owner and establishes subsidiaries 
abroad. The function of the money launderer’s front is to provide advisory services at 
home and abroad. For the next step, they set up a professional website and a representa-
tive business address. It is essential that the money launderer actually provide some of the 
offered advisory services, which requires the involvement of existing companies. Only 
then do they shift the focus of services abroad, choosing destinations that make it almost 
impossible to verify the actual provision of the services. The money launderer then offers 
hard-to-objectify services, such as brand development, market analysis, and business bro-
kerage services, the payment for which is made by bank transfer from e.g. Russia, Latvia 
and Kazakhstan. By simulating operating expenses, the money launderer ensures the plau-
sibility of the business. Moreover, by including various neighboring countries and off-
shore centers, the money launderer creates a complex structure with multiple levels of 
concealment, complicating any potential investigation. Additionally, having accounts in 
different jurisdictions ensure the social fabric. Ultimately, meticulous care is taken to en-
sure that the accounting books withstand a comparison to other companies within and 
outside the industry. Tax assessments are consistently permitted and taxes are paid 
promptly. 
 
Establishing a public limited company in a trustworthy country is not a major problem. 
For example, thanks to the express procedures of Switzerland’s commercial register, the 
process can be completed there within two weeks. The advantages of creating a stock cor-
poration with a network of other legal persons primarily ensures the higher credibility of 
international business dealings. Especially when establishing further business relation-
ships in Germany and Austria, a stock corporation is much less scrutinized than a limited 
liability company, creating a credibility that is vital to money launderers. Therefore, 
known as a safe haven in international business, Switzerland is a considerably more trust-
worthy jurisdiction than others for establishing a stock company that (ostensibly) adheres 
to fiscal responsibility. In contrast, a company registered in South Africa or the Cayman 
Islands, for example, is already suspect in European business.  
 
A stock company in Switzerland should be established by a beneficial owner who is veiled, 
which can be done, for example, via subsidiaries and parent companies abroad. In times 
of increasing pressure from the OECD and the notorious Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
program, the possibilities of disguising the beneficial owner have experienced a historic 
low for fiscal reasons. In terms of long-term obfuscation, bearer shares no longer offer a 
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serious solution. Instead, the use of chastity bonds and legal persons provide better alter-
natives. In the case of the latter, the beneficial owner is usually questioned, but they may 
be disguised abroad on several levels. Using straw people is by far the most discreet obfus-
cation method. However, they are also subject to a certain risk that they may potentially 
act contrary to the interests of the money launderer. 
 
The choice of the company’s stated purpose is essential. In principle, at this stage the com-
pany declares its interest in providing services in Germany and abroad, making it easier to 
justify an international customer base later. The most suitable consulting services involve 
family offices, given that they are not objectifiable. However, in the case of family office 
services, special care must be taken to ensure that no financial services are provided, as 
otherwise the company might have to join a self-regulatory organization. 
 
In order to withstand superficial checks by authorities and banks, it is especially important 
to maintain a professional website. Pure domiciliary companies tend to face greater scru-
tiny and appear less trustworthy than companies with their own offices and employees. 
A website without subpages, which is obviously not search engine optimized and is thus 
only conditionally suitable for the acquisition of new customers, appears suspicious to 
the naked eye. Therefore, a clever money launderer ensures that their website meets the 
standards of medium-sized consulting companies. 
 
Furthermore, the practical money launderer choses a representative business address that 
does not cause excessive costs or attract the suspicion of neighbors due to vacant offices. 
Therefore, it should not be located at a known address for domiciliary companies in the 
canton of Zug, for example. It would be better to choose a small office near the University 
of St. Gallen, which would be affordable and appear more plausible at first glance. The 
proximity of the office to the university could even be used as a front providing access to 
international know-how. 
 
This is followed by what is probably the biggest obstacle to this method of money laun-
dering: this newly founded consulting firm must actually provide consulting services for 
easily verifiable clients in Switzerland. This serves as a proof of the actual conduct of con-
sulting services, which could mitigate or even eliminate any suspicion of money launder-
ing in the event of an investigation. Therefore, it is essential that established and trust-
inspiring companies are advised. 
 
Companies to be consulted are selected in two ways: 1) the money launderer can use an 
already existing company, such as restaurant, for example, to be advised; 2) existing con-
sulting firms could be bought up and management consultants recruited with a solid cus-
tomer base. 
 
By holding such investments, a solid customer base can be simulated. For the next step, 
fictional customers are created abroad. These clients are located in jurisdictions where it 
is possible to inject large amounts of cash into the banking system. To this end, it is par-
ticularly suitable to choose jurisdictions in Eastern Europe, as the supervisory authorities 
there are sometimes less strict than in Switzerland, Germany or Austria. Moreover, the 
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high level of corruption in these countries suggests that even strict controls can be circum-
vented. 
 
The fake Eastern European customers make use of various advisory services, including the 
especially popular market analysis. For example, let’s say some money launderers have cre-
ated a new brand for the introduction of a sweet-tasting soft drink on the world market 
to compete with existing brands in this area. There are barely any upper limits to the sums 
of the consulting fees for such a product. Other customers, however, use less sophisticated 
and more modest services, such as the recommendation of a school or university in Eu-
rope for their children. 
 
Next, business expenses are simulated. The advantage of this is that a consulting company 
without personnel expenses would seem less plausible. Next, expenses for the company 
headquarters as well as for company cars have to be considered, which should be in line 
with industry averages to withstand a possible examination by the investigative authori-
ties. The size of the consulting firm will dictate the exact amount of expenditures. 
 
Consulting companies typically face a fairly high expenditure for the above-mentioned 
camouflages. Therefore, it is essential that these funds not end up in the private pockets 
of auxiliaries, but ultimately remain in the economic sphere of the money launderer. Uti-
lizing subcontractors abroad can achieve this effect. For example, agencies in Russia could 
receive lavish fees for brokering Russian consulting clients. Consulting companies in Du-
bai, for example, could provide part of the services, which would then be billed using 
standard transfer pricing methods. Moreover, Cost Plus and the Resale Minus methods 
appear to be particularly suitable in this context. 
 
By including foreign companies, the money launderer creates complex networks, which 
can only be checked with considerable effort. No authority would question that such a 
consulting firm holds interests in other consulting firms and recruitment agencies in more 
than 20 countries. This, in turn, complicates any investigation of the social fabric, as offi-
cial and legal assistance would be necessary from more than 20 countries, thus signifi-
cantly delaying and complicating any investigation. 
 
In addition, all subsidiaries should have bank accounts in different jurisdictions, ensuring 
that the companies will be even more confusing. Ideally, other jurisdictions would have 
to be included in any investigations, creating additional complexity. This would help, for 
example, if a bank suspects money laundering. With active accounts both at home and 
abroad, the company is capable of acting even if under suspicion. 
 
Furthermore, by consistently accepting tax assessments and promptly paying any tax 
debts, the aforementioned consulting companies benefit from additional camouflaging, 
as money launderers would not want tax authorities to take a second look at their ac-
counts. After all, these companies can avoid scrutiny best by meticulously managing 
books, hiring a confidence-inspiring tax expert who has good contacts with the relevant 
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C. Resources 
 
To implement the illustrated method of money laundering, the money launderer needs 
placement options for cash deposits. This requires a bank with correspondent branches 
abroad and a solid network of offshore companies with bank accounts in Dubai, for ex-
ample, and other destinations. In addition, owning a company in Switzerland with con-
sultants, directors and a good reputation is necessary. 
 
Placement by cash deposits in this variant is quite a challenge. Ideally, the money laun-
derer has good contacts with banks in Russia and Kazakhstan where he or she deposits 
the criminal funds. Then, the funds are transferred twice within Russia, after which the 
money launderer has to transfer the criminal funds abroad. Upon the third transfer, the 
money launderer will ensure that the money reaches an account that allows for further 
transfer abroad. Due to current sanctions on Russia, this means the money lands in a Ka-
zakh bank. As European banks have settled in these post-Soviet countries, a bank with 
correspondent branches in Switzerland should be easy to find. 
 
At the same time, establishing companies in countries like the United Arab Emirates (Du-
bai) provides a significant advantage to the money launderer due to their free-trade zones. 
Once such a company has been set up (which can be done quite easily), and together with 
a letter of recommendation from another bank, there should be no further obstacles to 
opening the bank account in Dubai. 
 
A similar company in Switzerland is also easy to set up. However, given that consultants, 
directors and a good reputation are required, it is worth considering whether or not buy-
ing an existing company with a solid infrastructure and customer base. Any new company 
should include competent advisers in order to be able to exercise actual control over the 
funds. To avoid surprises, the money launderer ensures the competency of his advisers so 
that any problems arising from language barriers are avoided. 
 
Furthermore, a money launderer needs directors to ensure an actual offer. A consulting 
firm without a director is usually considered to have very poor credibility. Moreover, the 
presence of real people on the internet who can actually be contacted makes it easier for a 
company to withstand a superficial review. 
 
Most suitable are directors with a good reputation. Should the local prosecutor's office 
have doubts about the company, a director with an impeccable reputation as an honora-





Any official and legal assistance is clearly a risk that could remove the anonymity of the 
beneficial owner, which is a serious problem for the money launderer. An additional risk 
is transaction analysis by the banks. A money launderer must also remember that cash fees 
are uncommon in the consulting industry and would certainly give rise to suspicion. 
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Moreover, excessively high fees or silent companies could quickly attract a detailed check 
by the police, the prosecutor’s office or the tax authorities. 
 
Official and legal assistance are the money launderer’s natural enemies. Transaction anal-
yses by banks pose another problem. For example, a Swiss bank could investigate suspi-
cious transactions and choose to report them to the Swiss Money Laundering Reporting 
Office to protect themselves from compliance risks. It is therefore important to keep 
banks happy by being open and cooperative in sustaining a lucrative business together. 
Small private banks are probably better suited for this purpose than large corporations, 
since the individual customer in smaller banks carries more importance. Thus, a money 
launderer should encourage the bank, through commercial interests and proper fulfill-
ment of all formal compliance requirements, to refrain from reporting. Alternatively, it 
helps to choose banks with less competent compliance officers. However, it can prove 
difficult to determine ex ante which compliance officer will audit the transaction. Thus, 
it may make more sense to seek out corrupt compliance officers. 
 
Instituting cash fees is uncommon in the consulting industry and would immediately at-
tract attention, especially during a transaction analysis. Over time, a detailed review of the 
company by the police, the prosecutor’s office or the tax authorities should always be ex-
pected. As a precautionary measure, having some real customers in Switzerland is wise. A 
money launderer should be well-prepared: if he or she begins to fake contracts after the 
first house search, then it is usually already too late. A forward-thinking money launderer 
expects a search of his or her business premises at some point and maintains complete, 
plausible and reputable-looking documentation of every important business transaction 
there. By observing these precautionary measures, he or she can manage to curb suspicion 
immediately. 
 
Silent companies could also be dangerous for the money launderer. It is therefore im-
portant that he or she creates the appearance of activity in order to reduce the risk. A web-
site that is easy to find using popular search engines can be helpful here. 
 
A serious problem is the large number of persons involved – ultimately, these connections 
can always be used as potential witnesses in criminal proceedings. By creating plausible 
companies, several people are involved in the end, and they have access to business rec-
ords. Therefore, it is advisable to use close confidants and small companies. 
 
E. Overall Assessment 
 
The method and strategies presented above offer many advantages for money laundering. 
In particular, it is suitable for laundering large amounts of money while only taking on 
relatively low costs. While restaurants have to cope with the cost of goods, for example, a 
consulting company has to shoulder significantly less effort. Yet, this model also carries 
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certain risks, the most potentially devastating being the number of potential witnesses.17 
 
It should also be kept in mind that this method attracts the attention of compliance of-
ficers relatively often. Within the scope of this study, 62 percent of the surveyed compli-
ance officers mentioned being aware of cases of money laundering in connection with 
consulting services in the past three years. The main reason for this is that consulting ser-
vices are usually paid through bank accounts rather than in cash, which inevitably involves 
banks and compliance officers. However, achieving success by undertaking the above-
mentioned steps seems likely for the money launderer, as 85 percent of compliance officers 
believe that, in most cases, they are unable to detect money laundering activities carried 




In conclusion, it can be stated that the consulting sector in Austria, Germany, Liechten-
stein and Switzerland continues to remain extraordinarily attractive for money launder-
ing. Despite this reality, it has received relatively little attention in the literature, especially 
with regard to the actual methods used for laundering money.19 
 
This study has aimed to help fill this gap in the research. The methods outlined in this 
paper are suitable for all stages of the money laundering process, namely: placement, lay-
ering, and integration. While money laundering tends to be expensive in other business 
sectors, the consulting sector provides a potentially profitable alternative for money laun-
derers.20 This is largely due to tax benefits obtained through the involvement of offshore 
companies.  
 
In addition, few risks are presented in this method of money laundering, especially given 
that compliance officers often claim that money laundering in the consulting sector is un-
detectable. Data from our interviews with compliance officers confirms this.21 
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